

State Dept. review completed

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C03/03 007564 NOD257

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

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 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9684

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 18773

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: OPDC, MNUC, PREL, PARM, XD, US, PK
 SUBJECT: TEXT OF REAGAN-ZIA LETTER

REF: STATE 272735 AND RELATED

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NAIK HAD ARRANGED AFTERNOON MEETING SEPTEMBER 16 WITH PRESIDENT ZIA, BUT AS IT HAPPENED PRESIDENT CALLED ME TO SUGGEST WE COME FOR LUNCH AND "A RELAXED TALK." SO SENS, WOLF, AND I LUNCHEDED WITH ZIA, YAQUB KHAN, NIAZ NAIK, AND NAJMUDDIN SHAIKH. NOT A BAD LUNCH, EVEN IF MUTTON IS A BIT HEAVY IN THE MIDDLE OF A WARM DAY. ALL IN ALL WE HAD ALMOST TWO AND A HALF HOURS OF TALK. AH, YES, HOW DID IT GO?

3. ZIA WAS AS ALWAYS PATIENT, CORDIAL AND MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATING FRANKLY WITH HIM. HE WELCOMED OUR OFFER OF HELPING IN A DIALOGUE WITH INDIA, BUT RESISTED ANY UNILATERAL GESTURES ON SAFEGUARDS, INVOKING FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY, PRIDE, DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPOSSIBILITY AND (A NEW POINT) EVEN A JUDGEMENT

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THAT THE INDIANS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE NUCLEAR ISSUE TO MAKE A UNILATERAL OFFER BY PAKISTAN WORTHWHILE. HE TACTFULLY SUGGESTED WE MAY HAVE STIRRED UP INDIANS BY PUBLICIZING OUR CONCERNS. STILL, HE ASKED, HOW COULD HE REASSURE HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS?

4. BEST ONE CAN SAY, AS I REITERATED AND REPEATED HOW HE COULD DO THAT, IS THAT HIS REJECTION WAS JUST SHORT OF DEFINITIVE. HE AGREED TO GIVE MATTER FURTHER CAREFUL THOUGHT. HE WILL REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER, PROBABLY SAYING PAKISTAN WILL NOT ENRICH BEYOND THREE PERCENT, AND WELCOMING PRESIDENT'S WORDS RE THE SOVIETS, AFGHANISTAN, AND PAKISTAN, ETC.

5. WE HAD SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT EXCHANGE ABOUT TRUST AND NEED FOR GOOD FRIENDS TO TRUST ASSURANCES FROM ONE TO ANOTHER. I AGAIN EXPLAINED PRESIDENT TRUSTED HIM, WANTED TO TRUST HIM, ETC., BUT OUR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS KEPT RAISING UNSETTLING POINTS, E.G., CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A BOMB TRIGGER MECHANISM.

6. WHILE AIR DEFENSE, AIM-9L'S AND GROUND-AIR MISSILES, SEEMED TOP PRIORITY EARLY ON IN CONVERSATION, HE LATER EXPLAINED WHY HE HAD WRITTEN PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ABOUT COPPERHEAD, 500 ROUNDS OF WHICH, AFTER AIM-9L, NOW IS TOP PRIORITY REQUEST ON PAKISTAN'S INTEGRATED PROCUREMENT SCHEDULE. HE AND YAQUB WELCOMED IDEA THAT SECRETARY AND YAQUB SHOULD TALK FURTHER ABOUT NUCLEAR ISSUES AT NEW YORK.

7. YAQUB, I BELIEVE, GRASPED SOME OF MY TALKING

POINTS BETTER THAN ZIA AND MAY, MAYBE, INTERNALLY ARGUE CASE, WHILE ZIA'S WRITTEN REPLY IS UNDER

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CONSIDERATION, FOR SOME EFFORT ON SAFEGUARDS,
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9741

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S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 18879

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OPDC, PREL, MNUC, PARM, XD, US, PK
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND TENSIONS ON
- PAKISTAN'S BORDER

REF: STATE 272735 AND RELATED

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE AMBASSADOR, ADCM, AND POLCOUNS MET SEPTEMBER 16
WITH PRESIDENT ZIA, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN,
FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NIAK AND ADDITIONAL SECRETARY
NAJMUDDIN SHAIKH. DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION TOO
PLACE IN TWO PARTS, PRIOR TO AND BRIEFLY AT THE
CONCLUSION OF LUNCH. THE ENTIRE SESSION STRETCHED
OVER TWO AND A HALF HOURS. ALSO DISCUSSED
WERE AFGHANISTAN, THE INDIAN MILITARY THREAT AND
PRIORITIES FOR THE U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM. THE LATTER ARE REPORTED SEPTEL.

3. AFGHANISTAN

THE MEETING BEGAN WITH PRESIDENT ZIA READING PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER AND LISTENING TO THE ORAL TALKING
POINTS. (COPY LEFT WITH PAKISTANI NOTETAKER TO INSURE

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ACCURACY.) PRESIDENT ZIA EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "FINE LETTER" AND ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY HIS THANKS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S THOUGHTFULNESS IN SHARING PAKISTANI PRESENT DAY ANXIETY. PAKISTAN ALSO APPRECIATES THE ACCELERATED DELIVERIES OF TANKS AND I-TOWS.

4. ALTHOUGH PAKISTAN ORIGINALLY HAD THOUGHT THE SOVIET/DRA ATTACKS IN THE WEST WERE THE USUAL PRELUDE TO GENEVA, THE AUGUST ATTACKS WERE MORE EXTENSIVE AND THE DAMAGE MORE SEVERE. MOREOVER, THEY DID NOT STOP WITH GENEVA: THERE HAVE BEEN TWO VIOLATIONS IN THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS--ONE AN AIR VIOLATION, ANOTHER A BOMBING DEEP INSIDE PAKISTAN, AT SETRA SHIKRA IN NORTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY. ALTHOUGH TWENTY BOMBS WERE DROPPED THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES.

B) ZIA NOTED PAKISTAN LACKS A GROUND-TO-AIR CAPABILITY. WHILE PAKISTAN CANNOT EXPECT TO DEFEND THE WHOLE WESTERN BORDER, IT MUST BE ABLE TO BRING DOWN INTRUDERS THAT STRIKE DEEP INSIDE PAKISTAN, AS WITH THE LAST CASE. RECOGNIZING STINGER POST IS NOT AVAILABLE, ZIA HAS ASKED GENERAL BEG TO DISCUSS GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES WITH THE PENTAGON DURING HIS TRIP THIS FALL.

C) ZIA SAID THE PAK AIR FORCE WAS AWARE OF ITS AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE LIMITATIONS AND WANTED TO TRY THE E2C, OR PERHAPS GET AN AWACS ON LOAN FROM THE U.S. OR SAUDI ARABIA. ZIA INDICATED HIS APPROVAL, PROVIDED IT IS IN PAKISTAN'S FINANCIAL REACH. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED OUR OFFER OF AWACS WAS A CONTINGENCY ONE, E.G., IF THE SITUATION

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 5. PRESIDENT ZIA INDICATED PAKISTAN CAN BEAR UP
 UNDER THESE SOVIET ATTACKS. BUT HE NOTED SEVERAL
 ANXIETIES:

A) PAKISTAN HAS IMPROVED BY 200 PERCENT ITS
 MILITARY FORCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE FACING
 WEST. IN RESPONSE TO INCREASED THREAT IN THE
 WEST, THE GOP NOW HAS A CORPS (XI) WITH TWO
 DIVISIONS IN PESHAWAR AND A CORPS (XII) WITH A
 NEW SPECIAL ARMORED ELEMENT IN BALUCHISTAN.

(COMMENT: WE ASSUME ZIA IS INDICATING THAT AN
 ARMORED ELEMENT PREVIOUSLY IN MULTAN AS PART OF
 II CORPS NOW IS ASSIGNED TO XII CORPS IN QUETTA.

END COMMENT) HOWEVER, TWO THINGS ARE LACKING

-- THE TROOPS' MORALE IS BEING HURT BY THEIR
 INABILITY TO RESPOND TO SO MANY VIOLATIONS, AND WITHOUT
 A PROPER MISSILE, THE F-16S (WHICH ZIA AVERRED WOULD
 ONLY FACE WEST) CANNOT RESPOND. ZIA HAS ISSUED
 ORDERS TO BRING DOWN INTRUDING AIRCRAFT ONLY IF
 THERE IS "100 PERCENT CERTAINTY" OF DROPPING THE
 INTRUDER ON PAKISTAN SOIL. TO DO SO, PAKISTAN
 URGENTLY NEEDS THE AIM-9LS. PAKISTAN'S RECENT
 REQUEST FOR COPPERHEAD (500 ROUNDS) IS A HIGH
 PRIORITY SINCE IT WILL HELP MEET THE THREAT OF
 ARMORED INCURSIONS AND IMPROVE MORALE. THE
 AMBASSADOR SUBSEQUENTLY REITERATED WE WOULD NOTIFY
 CONGRESS ON AIM-9L WHEN CONGRESS RETURNS FOR ITS
 NEW SESSION AND SUGGESTED WE WILL REVIEW OTHER

OPTIONS IF THE PACE OF SOVIET ATTACKS ESCALATES.

6. NUCLEAR ISSUE

ENRICHMENT

ZIA MADE CLEAR AT THE START OF THE TALK THAT HE

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 STOOD BY HIS COMMITMENT ON ENRICHMENT. IN FACT,
 HE SAID, PAKISTAN WOULD NOT ENRICH URANIUM BEYOND
 THREE PERCENT. HE REITERATED THIS ASSURANCE
 LATER AT LUNCH.

TRUST

ZIA RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE SAME THEME --
 SHORT OF SURRENDERING RIGHTS AS A SMALL AUTONOMOUS
 STATE, AND SURRENDERING PAKISTAN'S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
 "I CAN'T UNDERSTAND HOW WE CAN SATISFY THE U.S."
 NEAR THE END OF LUNCH HE NOTED THAT IN HIS 1981
 CONVERSATIONS WITH THEN DEPARTMENT COUNSELOR
 MCFARLANE, THEY HAD AGREED TWO ISSUES WOULD NOT
 COME UNDER DISCUSSION: A) PAKISTAN'S FORM OF
 GOVERNMENT -- AN INTERNAL QUESTION; AND B) THE
 NUCLEAR PROGRAM -- "WE WILL TELL THE U.S. ALL
 ABOUT OUR PROGRAM BUT IT MUST NEVER COME UNDER
 DISCUSSION." ZIA SAID HE UNDERSTANDS PRESIDENT
 REAGAN'S CONCERNS BUT CITED TRUST AS AN IMPORTANT
 ELEMENT -- "EVERYTHING CANNOT BE WRITTEN; IF TRUST
 DOES NOT EXIST THEN THE STRUCTURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP
 IS ALWAYS SUBJECT TO MANY WEAKNESSES." HE NOTED NO
 POLITICAL GOVERNMENT COULD EVER HAVE GIVEN IN WRITING
 THE ASSURANCES HE GAVE TO VICE PRESIDENT BUSH.
 STILL HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A RELATIONSHIP SO
 PAINSTAKINGLY BUILT OUGHT NOT TO FALL ON MERE
 SUSPICION.

7. IN RESPONSE TO THESE POINTS THE AMBASSADOR

INDICATED THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS WANT TO TRUST
 PRESIDENT ZIA'S REPEATED ASSURANCES BUT IT IS
 DISTURBING WHEN THE ANALYSTS, WHOSE JOB IT IS
 TO TRY TO KNOW, SAY SOMETHING IS GOING ON. WE
 BELIEVE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT WE HAVE EXTREMELY
 RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT WORK STILL GOES ON

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ON A BOMB TRIGGERING MECHANISM. THERE IS OTHER
INFORMATION THAT ALSO RAISES DOUBTS. HE REMINDED
ZIA THAT JIM BUCKLEY HAD HAD TO PURSUE NUCLEAR
ISSUE IN 1981 AND THAT WITHOUT PAKISTAN ASSURANCES
CONGRESS WOULD NOT HAVE APPROVED THE PROGRAM.

8. THERE ARE WAYS TO REMOVE DOUBTS. WAYS THAT DO
NOT COMPROMISE SOVEREIGNTY. COMPROMISES THAT GO NO
FURTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY ACCEPTED BY MANY COUNTRIES.
INCLUDING PAKISTAN. E.G., THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AT
KANUPP. ONE ACCEPTS "INFRINGEMENT" OF SOVEREIGNTY
WHEN ONE SEES IT IS OF VALUE TO YOU, AND IF IT IS
FREELY ACCEPTED, IT IS NOT AN INFRINGEMENT.
SAFEGUARDS, ACCESS TO UNSAFEGUARDED FACILITIES,
OR SOME VISIBLE CHANGE IN THE PROGRAM ALL COULD
HELP REMOVE DOUBTS. SOVEREIGNTY NEED NOT BE THE
ISSUE, ALTHOUGH AS PRESIDENT ZIA HAD SAID IN JULY
(AND ALLUDED TO TODAY) PRIDE IS A FACTOR. OUR
JUDGMENT IS THAT MOVEMENT IN THESE AREAS WOULD BE
ENORMOUSLY HELPFUL IN REASSURING US AND OF LESSENING
THE FAIRLY HIGH RISK OF INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN'S
NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

9. INDIAN DIMENSION

ZIA, ALTHOUGH PATIENT AND COLLECTED THROUGHOUT THE
TALK, SHOWED SOME EXASPERATION ON THE QUESTION OF
INDIA, ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD PAKISTAN, AND TOWARDS
PAKISTAN'S PROPOSALS FOR A NUCLEAR DIALOGUE. HE
RECITED THE PROPOSALS HE HAS MADE -- NUCLEAR

WEAPONS FREE ZONE, NPT ADHERENCE, FULL SCOPE
SAFEGUARDS, MUTUAL INSPECTIONS, BUT THERE HAS BEEN
NO INDIAN RESPONSE. "WE WILL TALK AND COME TO
ANY ARRANGEMENT WITH INDIA IF IT WILL JUST RESPOND."
ZIA VOICED DOUBTS INDIA IS PREPARED TO TALK -- INDIA
IS UNDER OBLIGATION TO THE SOVIETS AND, BECAUSE OF

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AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS (WHILE THEY WILL NOT CROSS
PAKISTAN'S BORDERS) WILL MAKE INDIA CONTINUE TO
"PRESSURIZE" PAKISTAN.

10. MORE IMPORTANTLY, ZIA DOUBTS THE COOLING IN
RELATIONS WITH INDIA IS DUE TO INDIAN APPREHENSION

OVER THE PAK NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE POINTED OUT
RELATIONS WITH INDIA HAD TURNED UP THIS SPRING.
EVEN WHILE U.S. ANALYSTS STILL WERE VOICING GREAT
CONCERN OVER PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM. ZIA BELIEVES
INDIA HAS BETTER INFORMATION ON PAKISTAN NUCLEAR
CAPABILITIES THAN THE U.S. AND KNOWS THE PROGRAM'S
LIMITATIONS. FOR THIS REASON, A UNILATERAL GESTURE
BY PAKISTAN, E.G., OPENING ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES
TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION IN SOME FORM, WOULD
NOT IMPRESS THE INDIANS. (NOTE: ZIA SEEMED TO
IMPLY THAT INDIA HAD NOT BEEN CONCERNED BEFORE,
BUT REPEATED U.S. EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN, ILL-FOUNDED
THOUGH THEY ARE, NOW MAY LEAD THEM TO NEW CONCLUSIONS.)
A REAL ISSUE FOR INDIA IS ITS FEELING THAT THE U.S.,
BY ARMING PAKISTAN, IS POSING A CHALLENGE TO INDIA.
THE U.S. SHOULD TRY TO DISSUADE INDIA FROM THIS VIEW.

11. ZIA INDICATED HE HAD MET THREE DAYS AGO WITH
HIS INDIAN EXPERTS -- AMBASSADOR HUMAYUN WAS
RECALLED FOR CONSULTATIONS -- TO SEE HOW A DIALOGUE

WITH INDIA COULD BE RESTARTED. ZIA MADE CLEAR TO
THEM THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT BE PROVOKED BY INDIA
AND AMBASSADOR HUMAYUN WILL RETURN TO DELHI TO
RESTATE PAKISTAN'S DESIRE FOR DIALOGUE. ONE NEW
AREA WHERE PAKISTAN WILL SEEK EARLY TALKS IS ON
ANTI-TERRORISM, WHERE BOTH SIDES HAVE CONCERNS.
ZIA COMMENTED THAT A UNILATERAL GESTURE NOW ON
THE NUCLEAR FRONT BY PAKISTAN WOULD NOT REASSURE
INDIRA GANDHI AND RESTART POLITICAL TALKS. "IT

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THEIR REAL ASSESSMENT). WE DO NOT SEE SIGNS OF AN
IMMINENT INDIAN ATTACK BUT, WERE WE TO SEE SUCH
INDICATIONS, WE WOULD "GET TO YOU IMMEDIATELY."

13. ZIA GAVE NO GROUND AT THE CONCLUSION OF LUNCH
WHEN HE RETURNED THE CONVERSATION TO NUCLEAR MATTERS.
HE REITERATED HIS POINT THAT SMALL DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES ARE SELF-CENTERED AND EMOTIONAL ON CERTAIN
ISSUES. NEITHER A MILITARY GOVERNMENT, MUCH LESS
A POLITICAL GOVERNMENT, COULD ADOPT POLICIES
UNACCEPTABLE TO AND NOT UNDERSTOOD BY THE
PUBLIC. WHILE GRATEFUL TO THE PRESIDENT, HE, ZIA,
LACKED AN IDEA AS TO WHAT PAKISTAN COULD DO TO
REMOVE SUSPICION THAT UNNECESSARILY EXISTS.
HOWEVER, (SOMEWHAT WEARILY) HE PROMISED TO
RE-EXAMINE THE OPTIONS AND TO RESPOND TO THE
PRESIDENT IN A FEW DAYS. WE COULD ASSURE THE
PRESIDENT THAT HE APPRECIATED HIS LETTER AND THE
ORAL PRESENTATION. HE WOULD AGAIN THINK ABOUT
HOW HE COULD DO MORE TO REASSURE HIS AMERICAN

FRIENDS.

14. DEPARTMENT REPEAT NEW DELHI.

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